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SUPREME

COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Where a number of persons engaged in the same business, within the
same territory, enter into an agreement, the object of which is purely
and simply to silence and stifle all competition among themselves, the
agreement is in restraint of trade, and void as against public policy. If
it appears that such a combination is injurious to the public, the courts
will not stop to inquire as to the degree of injury inflicted, nor whether
the restraint be general or partial, nor will they consider the form and
declared purpose of the combination.
A combination among brewers to prevent competition among themselves in the sale of beer is illegal.
CONTRACTS RESTRICTING

COMPETITION.

The decision in the principal case exhibits a strict application of that rule of public policy, whose function has been
to jealously guard against any invasion of public interests, by
contracts which affect the freedom of trade and competition.
As far back as the second year of Henry V.(I 4 15) (year-book
5-26), we find that contracts imposing a restraint upon trade
were discountenanced, as being opposed to the common law.
In the Case of the Monopolies (16o2) (I I Coke, 86), Chief
Justice Popham held that the grant by letters patent to the
plaintiff of the sole making of playing cards within the realm,
was utterly void as being a monopoly, and against the common law. Among the four reasons advanced by the court
were the followng: I. "All trades as well mechanical as
'Reported in I6r Pa. 473 ; decided May 14, 1894.
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others, which- prevent idleness (the bane of the Common-wealth) and exercise men and youth in labor for the maintenance of themselves and their families, and for the increase of'
their substance, to serve the Queen, when occasion shall
require, are profitable for the Commonwealth; and therefore
the grant to the plaintiff to have the sole making of them, is.
agairist the common law, and the benefit and. liberty of the
subject. 2. The sole trade of any mechanical artifice or any
other monopoly, is not only a damage to those who exercisethe same trade, but also to all other subjects; for the end
of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees;
and although provisions and cautions are added to moderate
them, yet res profecto stulta est nequitia
enodus, it is mere folly
to think that there is ,any measure in mischief or wickedness.
And therefore there are three inseparable incidents to everymonopoly against the Commonwealth; a, that the price
of th6 same commodity will be raised; for he who bas thesole selling of any commodity may and will make the price
as he pleases; b, after the monopoly is granted, the commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before;
for the patentee having the sole trade regardi only his private
benefit and not the Commonwealth; c, it tends to the'impoverishment of divers artificers and others, who before by the
labor of their hands in their art or trade, had maintained
themselves and their families, who now will of necessity be.
constrained to live in idleness and beggary."
This case, though involving what has been termed an,
involuntary restraint upon trade, illustrates in a comprehen-sive way the attitude of the courts in those early days toward
anything that savored of a trade restriction or monopoly; and.
the language and reasoning of the court can be appropriatelyreiterated at this day.
Chief Justice Parker in the leading case of Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711), (I P. Wms. 181), after examining the earlierdecisions and considering the subject thoroughly, concludes.
as follows; "In all restraints of trade, where nothing more*
appears, the law presumes them void; but if the circumstances are set forth, that presumption is excluded, and the-
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court is to judge of those circumstances and determine
accordingly; and if upon them, it appears to be a just and
honest contract, it ought to be maintained."
In that case the circumstances disclosed to the mind of the
court a reasonable restraint, and the obligation was accordingly held to be binding.
From the varying nature of contracts of the kind under
consideration, it-is not surprising that different judges have
arrived at apparently different conclusions as to what shall be
deemed "a just and honest contract," and especially has this
become the case since the courts have abandoned the arbitrary rules of time and distance once in vogue, and come to
cdnsider such contracts under changed conditions, with a
broader view, the question being in the language of Chief
Justice Fuller (Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396) :
"whether under the particular circumstances of the case, and
the nature of the particular contract involved in it, the contract
"Public welfare," says the Chief
is or is not unreasonable."
Justice, "is first considered, and if it be not involved, and therestraint upon one party is not greater than protection to the
other party requires, the contract may be sustained."
Most of the decided cases are those in which contracts havebeen entered into by a vendor of a business and its goodwill
with his vendee, by which the vendor agrees not to engage in
the same business within the same territory; in these cases
the restrictive covenant is usually based upon a consideration,.
and is merely giving effect to the transfer of the goodwill.
In such cases the rights of the respective parties should beprimarily considered and determined accortling to the test of"reasonableness; " if the restriction be reasonable, the rights
of the public are not affected, for where the question is whetherone party or another shall have the trade of a particular local-ity, as was said by Chief Justice Parker, "the concern of thepublic is equal on both sides."
If the restriction prove unreasonable, it should be therestricted party's right, as well as the imperative demand of'
public policy, that he be permitted to do that, which protection to the other party does not require, and which will bene4'
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fit him and consequently the public: See Oregon Steam
Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall, 64.
Public policy is always opp6sed to having a person deprive
himself and the community of the benefit of his services; yet,
when by contract the person does so restrict himself for a consideration, it is not the province of public policy to step in and
say that the contract is presumably not binding, but for the
courts to say, unless your covenant is unreasonable, you
shall be bound by it as by any other. On the other hand, if
the contract is between or among competitors, and is of such
a nature and effect that it is certain competition will be utterly
destroyed and a monopoly created, to the detriment of the
public, then it is but proper for public policy (which is but a
part of the common law) to declare that the public interests
shall not be impaired or sacrificed, with no corresponding
benefit save but to a few individuals. Such a declaration has
been very positively made by the Act of Congress passed
July 2, 189o (U. S. Stat. at Large, 209), by which "every
contract combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal, etc." This much of the Act, however, is but declaratory of the common law, and leaves undefined some of the
terms it uses, and unsolved the questions which must necessarily arise under it, the same as before its passage. What is
the proper test of illegality? How much may competition be
affected without there being an undue restraint upon trade?
To what extent shall public policy be permitted to impair
the obligation of contracts? These are among the questions
which deserve careful and practical consideration; and, in
connection with the last, it may not be amiss to quote the
language of Sir George Jessel, M. R., in Printing Co. v.
Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462: "It must not be forgotten that
you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a
given contract is void-as being against public policy; because,
if there is one thing which more than another public policy
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and thai their
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contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be
held sacred, and shall be enforced. by courts of justice.
Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to con-.
sider, that you are not lightly to interfere with the freedom of
contract."
This injunction deserves attention; .for occasionally we see
displayed what seems to be a sort of spasmodic reverence for
the high-sounding term "public policy," and a questionable
decision is the result.
In this connection Judge Sanborn says: "It is with the
public policy of to-day that we have now to deal. In considering that subject we-are not to be governed by our own views of
the interests of the people, or by general considerations tending to show what policy would probably be wise or uiiwise.
Such a standard of determination might be unconsciously
varied by the personal views of the judges who constitute the
court. The public policy, of the nation must be determined
by its Constitution, laws, and judicial decisions. So far as
they disclose it, it is our province to learn and enforce it;
beyond that, it is unnecessary and unwise to pursue our
inquiries."
Directing our attention, then, to some of the modem judicial
decisions upon restraints of trade, we will make two classes:
(I) those cases in which the restraint is confined to covenants
to abstain from doing something, as trading under certain
conditions; (2) those in which two or more parties, competitors in business, combine with a view toward concentrating
or regulating the business.
In the first class, the injury to the public arises from the
unreasonable abstinence from trade or profession, with its
incidental effect upon competition; the vice in the second class
occurs from the probable impairment or restriction of competition, and the tendency to create monopoly.
The writer does not purpose touching upon the cases under
the first head, suffice it to say that the test of all such contracts
would seem to be their "reasonableness:" Gibbs v. Baltimore
Gas Co., supra; Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 96 ; Smith's App.,
113 Pa. 579; Patterson on Contracts in Restraint of Trade,
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where the subject is carefully considered in a reviewof all the cases.
Practically, this same test was suggested by, Parker, C. J_
(17I), he using the words "just and honest" instead of'
" reasonable;" if it be a general restraint, it would very likely
be unreasonable and unjust, hence void, especially at that time.
In the .second class, i. e. combinations, the public interests;
are concerned to a greater degree, and the contracts in question must be weighed very carefully in the judicial balance, to.
ascertain whether, as regards the public, they are "just and.
honest." If, on the one hand, they are certain to destroy
competition" and create a monopoly, they are opposed to public
policy, and void; if, however, they appear to afford but a
reasonable protection or privilege to the parties, even though
competition be incidentally affected, they should be supported
and enforced. This theoretical distinction is one which is very
difficult to be drawn in practice, and has been observed in.
some cases more consistently than in others. Competition.
has generally been regarded as the " life of trade," and as
monopolies are inimical to competition, they have always been:
regarded as odious: Case of the Monopolies, suka; Richardson v. Buhle, 77 Mich. 632; Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent
City Co., I I I U. S. 755 (Field J.), and in many States, Actssimilar to the "Anti Trust Act" of 1890, have been passed.
*But monopolies of some form or other have at all times
existed, and must necessarily exist; the people have survived
them. It is indeed a question, judging from the present state
of business affairs, whether competition is always the "life of
trade," and never its destroyer? Where two railroads are
operated in a section which can support but one, competition.
must force one or the other to' the wall. Extremely low rates
are very acceptable to the public while they last; subsequent
bankruptcy, however, is not.
In the following cases combinations have been declared
illegal, among manufacturers, to regulate rates of labor, hours;
of work, and conduct of business: Hilton v. Eckersly, 6 El. &
BI. 46; also Com. v. Carlisle, I Brightly (Pa.) 36.
Employees: People v. Fisher, i4 Wend. 9; U. S. v. Working24, 25 ;
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men's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed. Rep.
994; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. N. Pac. R. R., 6o Id.
803 ; contra, Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. I I I ; Snow v. Wheeler,
1 13 Mass. 179. Boat proprietors: Hooker v. Vandewater,

4 Denio, 349; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Id. 434; Anderson v.
Jett (Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep. 670; contra, Collins v. Locke, 4
App. C. 674; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 2
App. C. (1892), 25. Stenographers: More v. Bennett, I4O
111. 69. Coal operators: Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 ; Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co.,
68 N. Y. 558 ; U. S. v. Jellico Coal & Coke Co., 46 Fed. Rep.
433.

Oil: State v. Standard Oil Co., 3o N. E. Rep. 279.
Sugar: People v.North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582;

aff. 54 Hun. 354. Grain: Crafts v. McConaghy, 79 Ill. 346;
contra, Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Wis. 124. Salt: Salt Co. v.
Guthrie, 35 0. 666; contra, Ontario Salt Co. v. Merchant's
Salt Co., I8 Gr. Ch. Rep. 54o. Lumber: Mill & Lumber
Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387. Cotton seed: Texas Standard
Cotton Oil Co. v. Adoue, i S.W. Rep. 274. Candles: Emery

v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 0. 320. Matches: Richardson v. Buhle,
77 Mich. 632; contra, Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, io6
N. Y. 473. Cotton bagging: India Bagging Assn. v. Kock,
14 La. An. 168; Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. Iio.
Wire cloth: DeWitt Wire Cloth Co. v. N. J. Wire Cloth Co.,
16 Daly, 529. Tobacco. Hoffman v. Brooks, 23 Am. Law
Reg. 648.

Mineral waters: Urmston v. Whitelegg, 63 Law

Times, 455.
In Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., supra, a.combination of two
gas companies of Baltimore was condemned by the Supreme
Court of the United States, Chief Justice Fuller saying: "The
supplying of illuminating gas is a business of a public nature,
to meet a public necessity. It is not a business like that of
an ordinary corporation, engaged in the manufacture of articles that may be furnished by individual effort. Hence,
while it is justly urged that those rules, which say that a
given contract is against public policy, should not be arbitrarily extended so as to interfere with the freedom of contract (Printing Co. v. Sampson, supra); yet, in the instance
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of business of such character that it presumably cannot be
restrained to any extent whatever without prejudice to the
public interest, courts decline to enforce or sustain such contracts imposing such restraint, however partial, because in
contravention to public policy."
This distinction between business of a quasi-public nature
and private business, was considered by the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, in the recent case of U. S. v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, g8 Fed. Rep. 58, and gave rise
to a dissenting opinion by Judge Shiras.
In that case a bill had been filed by the United States under
the Act of I89o, to restrain fifteen competing railroad companies of the West from carrying into effect an agreement
regulating the freight traffic, rates, etc. The Circuit Court of
Kansas, dismissed the bill (Riner, D. J.), holding that there
was nothing in the contract which necessarily tended to interfere with the rights of the public (53 Fed. Rep. 44o). This decree
was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals by.a divided
court. Sanborn, Circ. J., held that "it is not the existence of
the restriction of competition, but the reasonableness of that
restriction, that is the test of the validity of contracts that are
claimed to be in restraint of trade;" that it was one of the
kind of contracts, the purpose of which is "to so regulate
competition that it may be fair, open, and healthy, and
whose restriction upon it is slight, and only that which is
necessary to accomplish this purpose," and was not, therefore, an illegal restraint of trade; that it was not only proper,
but in accordance with public policy, that railroads should be
allowed to enter into such arrangements with each other.
Shiras, Dist. J., dissenting, relied upon the distinction laid
down by Fuller, C. J. (quoted supra), and held that while the
test as to private associations is uxidoubtedly the "reasonableness," and not the "existence" of restriction, yet such is
not the test when the action of public corporations relative .to
public duties is brought in question; and further held, that it
was "clearly contrary to the public welfare, and, therefore,
illegal, for these public corporations to enter into contracts
and combinations intended to limit or nullify the effect of
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free and unrestrainedcompetition upon the rates to be charged
the public for the services rendered in the transportation of
persons or property over the public highway." In other
words, that the public was entitled to absolutely free competition.
In the light of these most interesting opinions so recently
delivered, we will turn at this point to our case of Nester v. Continental Brewing Co. This case arose upon a
bill in equity for an account, and was heard upon bill and
demurrer; the facts were that the plaintiffs were members and
creditors of an unincorporated association, known as "The
Brewers' Association, of Philadelphia," of which the defendants
were also members:" the agreement forming the association
provided, inter alia, that "the undersigned hereby stipulate and
bind themselves, one to the other, and do hereby agree, one
with the other; not to sell and deliver any beer in the city and
county of Philadelphia, and Camden and Camden county, N. J.,
after July I, I886, to any new trade, or any other brewers' customer or customers that belong to this association, during the
continuance of this agreement, at less than eight dollars a
barrel" (penalties were' provided for violations); further, "The
board of trustees may call the association together from time
to time, and at any. sech meeting the price at which beer may
be sold, may be changed by a vote of not less than two-thirds
of all the members belonging to said association at the time of
voting thereon."
The demurrer to the bill was sustained by the Common
Pleas Court, Biddle, J., saying: "It cannot be gainsaid that
the object of this combination is to enable the forty-five brewers
of the County of Philadelphia, individuals, firms, and corporations, who have entered into it, to regulate and control the
sales and prices of beer within the city of Philadelphia, and the
County of Camden, N. J. It certainly is a combination in
restraint of trade, tending to destroy competition, and to create
a monopoly in an article of daily consumption."
This conclusion was endorsed by the Supreme Court, Sterrett, C. J., saying: "The test question in every case like the
present, is whether or not a contract in restraint of trade exists,

.648"

CONTRACTS RESTRICTING COMPETITION

which is injurious to the public interests. If injurious, it is
void as against public policy. Courts will not stop to inquire
as to -the degree of injury inflicted. It is enough to know that
the natural tendency of such contracts is injurious. So it is
obviously immaterial whether the restraint be general or partial. The application of the rule does not depend upon the
number of those who may be implicated, nor the extent of
space included in the combination, but upon the existence of
injury to the public."
The court seems to have construed this contract solely from
the standpoint of the public, and aided possibly by a presumption against its validity, as soon as the name of the association
*vas disclosed.
The test of" reasonableness " as applied to private business,
,recognized in both of the opinions in the Court of Appeals,
.supra, was not applied, but the test of Judge Shiras as to
public corporations and business .was practically used instead.
This business was certainly not "quasi public"
The cases cited by the court probably support the decision;
though in lome, different elements were present; for instance
in the Morris Run Coal Co. case, the combination was "wide
dn scope, general in its influence, and injurious in effects,"
ibecause it controlled an immense coml field, the source of
.supply of an article of prime necessity for a very large territory.
A brewery can be started where a coal mine cannot.
The following are cases in which combinations similar to
this one have been sustained: Skrainka v. Schaaringhausen,
8 Mo. App. 522; Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Wis. 124; Diamond
Match Co. v. Roeber, io6 N. Y. 473; Central Shade Roller
Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353; Wickens v. Evans, 3 Y. & J.
318; Collins v. Locke, 4 App. C. 674; Mogul S. S. Co. v.
McGregor, 2 App. C. (1892) 25; Dueber Mfg. Co. v. Howard
Watch Co., 55 Fed. Rep; 851; U. S. v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 58 Fed. Rep. 58; and the recent case of
Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. "Garst (R. I.), 28 Atl. Rep. 973, which
involved a combination among dealers in oleomargarine.
* In the case of Harrison v. Lockhart, 25 Ind. 112, the court
.(Ray, T.) held that, as it has been the policy of the law to
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,discourage and restrict the traffic in intoxicating liquors, it
would be a perversion of public policy, to apply it in cases
of contracts in restraint of such a trade, the same as in others.
Under the authority of this case, it might properly be asked,
which way should public policy have swayed in the principal
case?
Lord Bramwell says (Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, supra):
Certain kinds of contracts have been held void at common law
on the ground of public policy, a branch of the common law,
.however, which certainly should not be extended, as judges
are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law, than as
,expounders of what is called public policy. No evidence is
:given in these public policy cases. The tribunal is to say as
matter of law, that the thing is against public policy and void.
Row can the judge do that without any evidence as to its effeit
.and consequences.?"
G. HERBERT JENKINS.
:Philadelphia, July 26, 1894.

